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SYMPOSIUM: PANDEMICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 
PANDEMIC SURVEILLANCE – THE NEW PREDICTIVE
POLICING 
Michael Gentithes* and Harold J. Krent** 
Now that the first wave of the coronavirus is behind us, what will the 
future bring? As governments reopen society following lengthy stay-at-
home orders, they must strike a difficult balance. If the return to normalcy 
is too abrupt, infections could spike again in just a few months, creating a 
death toll as high as it might have been with no quarantine at all.1 An 
effective removal of quarantine orders, then, must ensure that the return 
to normalcy is appropriately paced. But how can we best plan to put our 
economy back together without jeopardizing public health? 
Officials in New York state have echoed Italy’s call for a staged 
return to normalcy by first allowing only those testing positive for the 
virus’ antibodies (who presumably now are immune) to return to work 
and travel.2 Would creation of such a two-class society comport with 
constitutional dictates? In other words, can the government in effect create 
classes of citizenship based on the greater or lesser likelihood that some 
will catch the disease? 
In Part I, we examine the growth of predictive policing, which 
similarly treats some individuals differently based on the likelihood that 
they will either commit or be the victim of a crime. If such surveillance 
does not lead to detention, incursion on the right to travel, or other loss of 
freedom, we believe such efforts to be constitutional, even though not 
* Assistant Professor, University of Akron School of Law. I dedicate this Article to the loving memory 
of Lula Gentithes, who would have encouraged me to write it. 
** Professor of Law, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
1. The Coronavirus Outbreak: Trump says he’s ‘looking at a date’ to begin easing
restrictions, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 17, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/us/coronavirus-
updates-usa.html?action=click&module=Spotlight&pgtype=Homepage#link-cfe0b1a 
[https://perma.cc/AK3H-6U89]. 
2. See Jason Horowitz, In Italy, Going Back to Work May Depend on Having the Right
Antibodies, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/04/world/europe/italy-
coronavirus-antibodies.html [https://perma.cc/HTA6-RTS5]. 
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always wise. Use of data to prioritize law enforcement efforts poses no 
insuperable constitutional obstacles. But deployment of predictive 
analytics can result in infringement on the right to liberty, as we relate. In 
Part II, therefore, we apply the lessons from the predictive policing 
context to assess current and potential expansion of public health 
surveillance in the midst of the pandemic. As with predictive policing, if 
the government focuses its data collection efforts on those most likely to 
contract the virus, no constitutional issue arises. But, if the government 
imposes a quarantine on those with the virus, a detention has occurred, 
and if the government then restricts the freedoms of those who are likeliest 
to catch the virus thereafter, then the rights to work and travel have been 
undermined. Courts then must balance the government’s public health 
interest against the constitutional infringement on the fundamental rights 
of work3 and travel.4 Based on the limited precedents to date, the 
government must demonstrate that any two-track system is highly critical 
to protect the community and also provide those in the lower class some 
limited opportunity to challenge the government’s classification, which 
would leave them stripped of the right to travel and possibly their ability 
to pursue a livelihood. Given that the balance between governmental 
power and individual rights tips towards the government in times of crisis, 
we end in Part III by suggesting the constraints that the government should 
respect when casting such a wide surveillance net. 
I. PREDICTIVE POLICING 
Police departments around the country have experimented in using 
data to predict where crimes will be committed and who is likely to be 
involved, whether as a perpetrator or victim. For the most part, those 
efforts have raised few constitutional issues. But, when the predictions 
result in an incursion on liberty, Fourth Amendment and other 
constitutional problems arise. We will briefly canvas some of the 
emerging forms of predictive policing and then address where, in our 
view, such policing crosses the line into unconstitutionality. 
Subsequently, we will apply that baseline to the health surveillance that 
has already occurred in the past few months, and that which is likely to 
arise in the future. 
Predictive policing embraces data analytics to identify where crime 
is likely to occur and identify likely perpetrators. There is an obvious 
3. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 97 (1873). 
4. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999). 
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correlation between past and future crimes.5 For instance, many police 
departments predict “hot” crime spots, and then assign extra personnel to 
patrol the area. Using data analytics, Sacramento police determined in 
2012, that there were forty-two hot spots in the city and assigned extra 
personnel there accordingly.6 The Department reported a significant drop 
in serious crime. Police in Memphis, Shreveport, and Minneapolis 
similarly relied on data analytics to determine “hot” spots and thus 
allocate resources to mitigate the risk of crime.7 These methods are 
designed to help police departments operate more efficiently by allocating 
resources and personnel to areas where crimes are likely to occur. Such 
efforts to shift resources to protect particularly vulnerable geographic 
locations raise no appreciable constitutional issues. 
Other communities, most notably Chicago, have also used data 
analytics to focus on individuals—as opposed to locations—most likely 
to be involved in violent crime. Based on a variety of factors including 
neighborhood, associations, and past involvement in crime, the Chicago 
Police Department decided to deliver notifications to those most at risk of 
being involved in violent crime, whether as the perpetrator or the victim.8 
That strategy derived from the sociological “network approach,” which 
concluded that 
victimization is not simply a function of spatial proximity or of 
individual risk factors such as age, race, gender, or gang affiliation, but 
also of how people are connected, the structure of the overall network, 
the types of behaviors occurring in the network, and an individual’s 
position in the overall structure.9 
5. “[P]redictive policing entails the application of quantitative techniques to forecast where
criminal activities might occur in the (near) future. The predictions based on these analytic tools can 
guide the decision-making of law enforcement agencies, especially with the deployment of its 
personnel.” Albert Meijer & Martijn Wessels, Predictive Policing: Review of Benefits and 
Drawbacks, 42 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 1031, 1032 (2019) (citations omitted). 
6. See, e.g., WALTER L. PERRY ET AL., PREDICTIVE POLICING: THE ROLE OF CRIME 
FORECASTING IN LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 61–62 (2013), https://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR233/RAND_RR233.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y72H-SYVS]. 
7. Id. at 64–76. 
8. Jeremy Gorner, Chicago Police Use “Heat List” as Strategy to Prevent Violence, CHI.
TRIB. (Aug. 21, 2013), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2013-08-21-ct-met-heat-list-
20130821-story.html [https://perma.cc/7UH6-6FAP]. 
9. Andrew V. Papachristos & Christopher Wildeman, Network Exposure and Homicide
Victimization in an African American Community, 104 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 143, 143 (2014). 
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That approach mirrored efforts in the public health field.10 The closer 
individuals were to others who were victims or killers, the more likely that 
they would end up as a perpetrator or victim. Although Chicago never 
released its algorithm, it announced that the algorithm included: 1) 
criminal record; 2) record of violence among the subject’s criminal 
associates; 3) gang membership; 4) degree to which the subject’s criminal 
activities are on the rise; and 5) types and intensity of criminal history.11 
The Department also asserted that it continuously was modifying the 
factors. Notifications offered social services such as job training and anger 
management, but they also carried with them a threat.12 Police warned that 
if those on the heat list ever committed a violent crime, prosecutors would 
seek an enhanced sentence. Although not binding on the court, police 
elicited prosecutors’ support and intended the threat to coerce 
compliance.13 
Chicago’s predictive policing program raises two constitutional 
questions. First, to the extent that detectives used the list to investigate 
crimes, would that probabilistic use of data violate the Fourth 
Amendment? Second, would the threat to charge perpetrators with more 
serious crimes if they had been previously warned violate Due Process? 
In response to incidents of violent crime, targeting those on the heat 
list is understandable, if perhaps unfortunate. Those individuals would be 
investigated not based on any conduct, but only on their propensity to be 
either perpetrators or victims of crime. And, if the algorithm’s factors are 
correlated with race, which we discuss later, then the heat list would lead 
to discriminatory investigations by Chicago police. Officers might then 
uncover more crime committed by the targeted racial group, perpetuating 
a cycle of high criminality for individuals in that group. 
Although the prospect of racial bias cannot be discounted, using the 
heat list for enhanced scrutiny is not unconstitutional per se. 
Investigations do not themselves curtail liberties. The individuals targeted 
for enhanced scrutiny are still free to travel and associate with whomever 
10. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1109,
1134–42 (2017). 
11. CHICAGO POLICE DEPT., SPECIAL ORDER S09-11, SUBJECT ASSESSMENT AND
INFORMATION DASHBOARD (2019), http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57b85-
155e9f4b-50c15-5e9f-7742e3ac8b0ab2d3.html [https://perma.cc/FB5B-M9B4].  
12. CHICAGO POLICE DEPT., SPECIAL ORDER S10-05, CUSTOM NOTIFICATIONS IN CHICAGO
(2015), http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57bf0-1456faf9-bfa14-570a-
a2deebf33c56ae59.pdf?hl=true [https://perma.cc/W87L-BRWX]. 
13. Chicago was by no means alone. See Ferguson, supra note 10, at 1146 (relaying that Kansas 
City police also succeeded in obtaining enhanced punishment for those offenders ignoring warnings). 
2020] PANDEMIC SURVEILLANCE 61 
they choose. The unwanted attention of course can be invidious, but police 
have free rein to investigate whom they please. 
Would presence on the heat list justify a Terry stop?14 We believe 
that presence on the heat list does not come close to providing the 
reasonable suspicion requisite for a brief investigatory stop, but it might 
add to the reasonable suspicion if the investigating officers can point to 
objective factors individuating their suspicion that the individual is 
suspected of a particular offense. Reasonable suspicion cannot arise 
merely from probabilistic data that an individual will be involved in some 
type of violent crime in the future.15 
Most profoundly, in our view, the threat of enhanced punishment 
violates Due Process. Punishment would be increased—assuming that 
prosecutors and courts agree16—in light of the refusal to heed a police 
warning.17 Two individuals committing the same crime, therefore, might 
be punished differently on that basis alone. To be sure, sentencing 
guidelines include a wide range of conduct justifying enhancements of 
sentences, such as refusal to show remorse or committing a crime in a 
particularly heinous manner. But the failure to heed a police warning to 
stay clear of danger differs in two principal respects. First, unlike with 
sentencing enhancements, it is the police department that has specified the 
condition warranting enhanced punishment, not the legislature. 
Sentencing policy is not made at the police level. Second, the punishment 
criterion is not sufficiently linked to commission of the crime to justify 
the enhancement. A state cannot enhance the crime of burglary based on 
indicia not directly related to the offense, such as on a finding that the 
individual has failed to hold down a job or failed to volunteer at a local 
community center.18 Failure to heed a generalized warning to obey the 
law does not justify enhanced punishment; all individuals are presumed 
14. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
15. See United States v. Mendez, 467 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he fact of gang
membership is not sufficient to generate a particularized, reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity . . . .”). 
16. Most likely, the higher charges resulted in plea agreements of more years.
17. Punishments in fact have been enhanced. See Josh Kaplan, Predictive Policing and the
Long Road to Transparency, SOUTH SIDE WEEKLY (July 12, 2017), 
https://southsideweekly.com/predictive-policing-long-road-transparency/ [https://perma.cc/9EX3-
3XHC]. 
18. For an argument that the heat scores violate the right to association, see THOMAS Q. FORD,
PITFALLS OF PREDICTIVE POLICING: LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES ARISING FROM THE CHICAGO 
POLICE DEPARTMENT’S PREDICTIVE POLICING INITIATIVES (2018) (unpublished manuscript on file 
with the authors). 
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to understand that they must obey the law.19 Even if encapsulated in a 
legislative directive, therefore, enhanced punishment predicated on 
ignoring the special warning violates Due Process. 
The danger of conditioning liberty on probabilistic data in sentencing 
is highlighted by the evidence-based sentencing adopted by over twenty 
states.20 Those states use predictive analytics to predict the likelihood of 
recidivism. The algorithm relies on factors such as the offender’s 
socioeconomic status and level of education. Predicating liberty on 
statistics, particularly when the statistics derive from individual 
characteristics beyond the offender’s control, departs from fundamental 
notions of moral desert. Even supporters of such risk-based sentencing 
call for limits on the use of static factors beyond an individual’s control 
within the assessments in order to ensure fundamental fairness.21 
To be sure, the length of punishment often is tied to predictions about 
the amount of time needed for deterrence, the likelihood of recidivism, 
and so forth. But reliance on such factors can also result in racial 
discrimination. ProPublica released a study of risk assessment for 
recidivism—like those used by the states above for sentencing—assigned 
to 7,000 people in Broward County, Florida for the purpose of 
determining whether to release those individuals on bail.22 The data 
revealed that race played a substantial factor in the recidivism projection, 
which then led to greater jail time for African Americans who committed 
similar offenses to whites. ProPublica tentatively concluded that the 
questions Florida law enforcement authorities asked about socio-
economic status and demographic conditions, such as whether a parent 
had been in jail or the number of people known to have used illegal drugs, 
played a substantial role in the bond decisions. These examples 
demonstrate that, when sentencing algorithms are driven by underlying 
data, that data may be linked to race. 
19. See, e.g., State v. Cerritos-Valdez, 889 N.W.2d 605 (Neb. 2017) (holding that punishment 
cannot be enhanced solely because an offender is undocumented, because that status is unconnected 
to the conduct underlying the offense); see also State v. Avalos Valdez, 934 N.W.2d 585 (Iowa 2019) 
(holding that a defendant’s undocumented status may be considered in sentencing only to the extent 
it relates to an otherwise relevant factor). 
20. Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of
Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 805 (2014). 
21. See Christopher Slobogin, A Defense of Modern Risk-Based Sentencing, in RISK AND
RETRIBUTION: THE ETHICS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PREDICTIVE SENTENCING (J. de Keijser, et al. 
eds., forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3242257 [https://perma.cc/
B3DW-6KT4]. 
22. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing 
[https://perma.cc/SY9M-CY8S]. 
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In short, predicating liberty on predictive analytics risks injustice. 
Just deserts should be based (to the extent possible) on the offender’s 
conduct, as well as on the related risk that the offender will commit serious 
crimes in the near term.23 Algorithms that consider individual 
characteristics in addition to broader societal interests should rely upon 
characteristics that are both pertinent to the offender’s future conduct and 
fair to consider because they fall within the offender’s control. Any 
algorithm risks including factors that are correlated with race or other 
invidious distinction. Chicago’s use of its heat list to increase punishment 
should not survive constitutional scrutiny. 
II. APPLICATION TO PANDEMIC SURVEILLANCE
The predictive policing and sentencing examples frame at least some 
of the risks of reliance on pandemic surveillance. We first inquire about 
the probabilistic decision to isolate an individual whom the state believes 
may be sick and then turn to the quarantine decision for someone who was 
exposed. Afterwards, we speculate about the use of such probabilities to 
determine, after the first wave of the pandemic has subsided, who can 
return to work, school, and travel. 
A. Temperature Capture Policies and the Constitution 
Consider the possible constitutional issues if the government were to 
adopt China’s extreme steps to use body temperature as a crucial datapoint 
in determining who can safely work and travel through society.24 Chinese 
officials have deployed so-called “thermometer guns,” which take an 
individual’s temperature through a scan of his or her forehead to check for 
possible coronavirus infections near airports, apartment buildings, and 
shopping malls.25 They have also begun using infrared thermal scanners 
that detect the body heat of each passenger entering railway stations.26 In 
America, private employers have begun monitoring employee 
temperatures with traditional thermometers in order to ensure their 
23. Slobogin, supra note 21. 
24. Shawn Yuan, How China is Using AI and Big Data to Fight the Coronavirus, AL JAZEERA 
(Mar. 1, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/china-ai-big-data-combat-coronavirus-
outbreak-200301063901951.html [https://perma.cc/HTY2-VFGC]. 
25. Emily Rauhala, Some Countries Use Temperature Checks for Coronavirus. Others Don’t 
Bother. Here’s Why., WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/coronavirus-temperature-screening/2020/03/14/24185be0-6563-11ea-912d-
d98032ec8e25_story.html [https://perma.cc/3P54-DGGV]. 
26. Yuan, supra note 24. 
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workforce’s safety.27 Though that private action does not raise Fourth 
Amendment concerns, such concerns will be raised if the government 
adopts similar measures in the weeks and months ahead. 
First, consider whether various government actions to capture 
individual temperatures would amount to a search. The Fourth 
Amendment typically requires the government to obtain a warrant based 
upon probable cause to believe that an individual has committed a crime 
before conducting any activity that amounts to a “search.”  But that term 
is notoriously amorphous. The Supreme Court has held that the 
government conducts a search when its actions violate an individual’s 
reasonable expectations of privacy,28 or when the government trespasses 
upon an individual’s property.29 
Although thermometer guns do reveal some limited health 
information, government use of them may not amount to searches. They 
appear more akin to warrantless breathalyzer tests at the scene of an arrest, 
which the Court has found limited enough not to be considered searches 
under the Fourth Amendment.30 Thermometer guns are even less invasive 
than a breathalyzer, as they do not require the subject to actively partake 
in the investigator’s measurement. Thermometer guns can also take 
measurements even more rapidly than a breathalyzer, again making them 
less constitutionally suspect. 
Use of infrared thermal scanners, however, present a closer question. 
First, it is unclear exactly what images of an individual the scanners 
reveal.  The Supreme Court has held that when the government deploys 
investigative technologies that are not in general public use to reveal 
details from inside one’s home, they have conducted a search.31 That 
doctrine’s applicability in places of public accommodation is less clear, 
27. Melissa Repko, As Coronavirus Cases Grow, Some of the Largest US Employers Including 
Walmart and Amazon Turn to Thermometers as Detection Tool, CNBC (Apr. 4, 2020, 9:50 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/04/coronavirus-walmart-amazon-turn-to-thermometers-as-
detection-tool.html [https://perma.cc/H52A-G9YE]; David Yaffe-Bellany, ‘Thermometer Guns’ on 
Coronavirus Front Lines Are ‘Notoriously Not Accurate’, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/14/business/coronavirus-temperature-sensor-guns.html 
[https://perma.cc/AF4R-MNUV]. 
28. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
29. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012). 
30. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184 (2016). In contrast, blood tests are
“significantly more intrusive” and less likely to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, 
depending upon the circumstances. Id. 
31. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“[O]btaining by sense-enhancing 
technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been 
obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ constitutes a search—at 
least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use.”) (quoting Silverman v. 
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)). 
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but if the government were to attach such scanners in private buildings 
without consent, its actions likely would amount to a Fourth Amendment 
search. 
Temperature grab technology, however, may be constitutionally 
deployed under an exception to the warrant requirement. Even if the 
government conducts a search, if its actions are reasonable, they may not 
require a warrant based upon probable cause. For instance, the 
government may not need a warrant based upon probable cause if “special 
needs” make obtaining a warrant impracticable and the government’s 
primary purpose is not general crime control.32 The special needs doctrine 
seems likely to apply. Obtaining individual warrants for temperature 
readings on hundreds of millions of citizens is extremely impracticable, 
and the government need to pace the lifting of quarantine orders is highly 
critical. So long as the government’s primary purpose in grabbing 
temperatures remains to control the spread of COVID-19, rather than 
bring criminal charges against quarantine violators, these policies likely 
would satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s strictures.33 
Even if Fourth Amendment hurdles can be overcome, governments 
should be wary of the ability of temperature grabbing technologies to 
provide useful data for processing. Some temperature reading 
technologies in this area are notoriously inaccurate.34 The equipment can 
be deployed incorrectly by inexperienced operators, be misallocated for 
human core temperature readings, or can measure surface skin 
temperatures in inaccurate environments (such as extreme summer heat) 
that will vary readings significantly.35 Thus, checkpoints based upon 
thermometers can be both over- and under-inclusive. First, they can 
under-inclusively screen for fevers, allowing travelers carrying COVID-
19 to pass through the checkpoint and infect many others. Second, they 
can generate false positives, finding higher temperature readings for 
individuals who have recently exercised or stood near an ambient heat 
32. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313–14 (1997). 
33. The government might also argue that the exigent circumstances exception applies.
Warrantless searches taken under exigent circumstances—such as the needs to provide urgent aid to 
a citizen, continue hot pursuit of a suspect, or prevent the imminent destruction of evidence—do not 
amount to a search triggering the warrant requirement. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011). 
But that exception does not fit comfortably to COVID-related surveillance. Exigent circumstances 
usually encompass a single case or potential danger, such as where the residents behind a closed door 
are either in harm’s way or likely to destroy evidence of wrongdoing. The potentially massive scale 
of temperature grabs, all conducted without any suspicion of wrongdoing, is of a different order from 
usual exigent circumstances. 
34. Yaffe-Bellany, supra note 27. 
35. Repko, supra note 27; Yaffe-Bellany, supra note 27. 
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source.36 Conditioning travel and work rights on such readings is highly 
troublesome. It may be akin to using gang affiliation information as a 
proxy for likely crime commission, a practice that can perpetuate 
underlying racial and socio-economic biases in the predictive policing 
context. And just as individual sentencing factors must be pertinent and 
within an individual’s control, temperature readings must be pertinent 
(meaning taken accurately) and based upon the actual body temperature 
of citizens, rather than external factors like the weather that may influence 
the results. Thus, the government must deploy the right temperature-
grabbing technologies using proper techniques, thereby accurately 
measuring core body temperature to control citizens’ movements. 
B. Technological Surveillance Tools and Constitutional Strictures. 
Second, we also agree that the government can use its traditional 
technological tools of surveillance to chart the path of anyone whom they 
have reason to believe is carrying the virus.  Such technologies may be 
critical in limiting the virus’ spread through “contact and trace” 
approaches that many jurisdictions are considering.37  Just as in the 
predictive policing context, extra scrutiny, whether based on observation 
or cell phone metadata records,38 does not by itself transcend Fourth 
Amendment limits39 although, as we discuss, constraints should be placed 
on use of the information after the contact tracing has come to an end. In 
Europe, many countries have relied upon aggregation of data that has been 
anonymized to avoid revealing any individual’s locations, movements, or 
behaviors. Mobile phone companies in Italy, Germany, and Austria have 
begun sharing such aggregated data with governments to broadly map 
patterns in citizens’ movements that might reveal trends in compliance 
with government quarantine orders.40 Other governments have chosen a 
36. Repko, supra note 27. 
37. See, e.g., Erin Sampson & Adam Conner, Digital Contact Tracing to Contain the
Coronavirus, Center for American Progress, April 22, 2020; Dennis Thompson, As States Reopen, 
What is “Contact Tracing” and How Does it Work, U.S. News, May 4, 2020. 
38. This “third-party doctrine” allows government investigators to warrantlessly access broad
financial information or metadata about phone calls made to others. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 
435, 442–43 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–46 (1979). 
39. We believe that both the federal and state governments have critical roles to play in reacting 
to the crisis. The constitutional questions we address do not depend on the identity of the 
governmental actor. 
40. Elvira Pollina & Douglas Busvine, European Mobile Operators Share Data for
Coronavirus Fight, REUTERS (Mar. 18, 2020, 9:55 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-
coronavirus-europe-telecoms/european-mobile-operators-share-data-for-coronavirus-fight-
idUSKBN2152C2 [https://perma.cc/LN3J-C3F8]. 
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more authoritarian approach that tracks individuals’ locations and 
contacts in order to enforce quarantine orders.41 Governments have also 
aggregated financial transactional data as a means of tracking citizens’ 
movements and associations during the pandemic, though it is unclear 
whether individual citizens’ data remains anonymous or encrypted. 
Anonymization of data is an important first step to protecting 
individual data privacy and constitutional rights.42 It ensures that any 
pandemic surveillance is generalized and programmatic, which is less 
constitutionally troubling.43 Generalized, programmatic government 
intrusions on personal privacy can be conducted without focusing the 
weight of the state on an individual suspect, potentially introducing biases 
based upon ethnic, racial, or socioeconomic backgrounds.44 By focusing 
pandemic surveillance on anonymized and aggregated data, governments 
can avoid highly intrusive access to individual information that might 
generate more social anxiety or be used to deny other rights or benefits to 
those individuals. As we suggest in Part III, however, governments must 
take additional protective measures beyond anonymization and 
aggregation to ensure that sensitive personal data is not later revealed and 
utilized without a warrant or probable cause. These measures could 
include sunsetting the data collection, housing the data with trustworthy 
third parties, and timely destroying data that might be nefariously 
repurposed once the pandemic passes. 
Moreover, we agree that isolation is appropriate for anyone whom 
the government believes, based on data, is very likely to be suffering from 
the coronavirus. The loss of liberty is palpable, but the public interest in 
sequestration is strong as well. In the related context of mental illness, the 
41. Id.; Gabriel Leung, Lockdown Can’t Last Forever. Here’s How to Lift It, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/opinion/coronavirus-end-social-distancing.html 
[https://perma.cc/ED6G-5SGL] (“In China, the location-based functions of the online payment 
platforms of Alibaba, Baidu and Tencent could be used to track people’s activity.”). 
42. European Data Protection Board, Statement on the Processing of Personal Data in the
Context of the COVID-19 Outbreak, at 2 (Mar. 19, 2020), 
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpb_statement_2020_processingpersonaldataandc
ovid-19_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9HW-FZ7C] (“Public authorities should first seek to process 
location data in an anonymous way (ie. processing data aggregated in a way that individuals cannot 
be re-identified), which could enable generating reports on the concentration of mobile devices at a 
certain location (‘cartography’).”). 
43. See Michael Gentithes, Suspicionless Witness Stops: The New Racial Profiling, 55 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=3420816 [https://perma.cc/KRW5-WGH4]. 
44. See id. For a discussion of the distinction between programmatic searches and targeted
searches, see Barry Friedman and Cynthia Benin Stein, Redefining What’s “Reasonable”: The 
Protections for Policing, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 281, 286–87 (2016) and BARRY FRIEDMAN, 
UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 177–78 (2017). 
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Supreme Court in Addington v. Texas45 held that the state had to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that preventative detention was justified to 
prevent an individual from doing harm to self or others. Although some 
early testing for the virus may have been inexact, the tests have improved 
to the point that the state may justifiably order isolation for anyone who 
tests positive—the risk to others has been all too plainly demonstrated.46 
The possibility that the test is accurate is high and the risk of release so 
great that isolation is warranted. Although state courts have articulated 
somewhat different standards of review for assessing isolation directives 
and quarantine, a number have analogized to the involuntary commitment 
context addressed in Addington.47 We presume that all state isolation and 
quarantine determinations will be subject to a comparable form of 
heightened review. 
Quarantining all those who have been in contact with someone 
infected poses a more difficult question. As in the predictive policing 
context, public health authorities must have particularized information 
that an individual has been exposed. Even then, such individuals have a 
modest chance of catching the disease, which undermines the potential 
relevance of that data and the fairness of using it to condition travel and 
work rights. China forced such individuals, and even those not exposed, 
into quarantine.48 Would that be constitutional here? The probabilities of 
infection are unclear—how direct must the exposure be, what are the odds 
of infection, and so on. On the one hand, the public interest in quarantine 
is strong but, on the other, the odds that any individual exposed will catch 
the disease are more modest. 
To satisfy the clear and convincing or similar standard, the means 
used by the government also must be reasonably tailored. The condition 
of confinement, whether in one’s home or in a prison, should be 
considered, as should the length of confinement. Is fourteen days 
45. 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
46. Laurie McGinley, FDA steps up scrutiny of coronavirus antibody tests to ensure accuracy, 
WASH. POST, (May 4, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/05/04/fda-steps-up-
scrutiny-coronavirus-antibody-tests-ensure-accuracy/ [https://perma.cc/ZVM6-PUBJ] (“The tougher 
requirements will make it harder to buy questionable tests, but officials say there should still be 
enough reliable options for hospitals, doctors and consumers.”) 
47. See, e.g., Greene v. Edwards, 263 S.E.2d 661, 663 (W. Va. 1980); Newark v. J.S., 652 A.2d 
265 (N.J. Super. 1993); Best v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, No. 03 CV.0365, 2003 WL 21518829 
(S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2003); State v. Snow, 324 S.W.2d 532, 534 (Ark. 1959). 
48. Nectar Gan, Lily Lee & David Culver, Healthy Wuhan Residents Say They Were Forced
Into Mass Coronavirus Quarantine, Risking Infection, CNN (Feb. 23, 2020, 7:16 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/22/asia/china-coronavirus-roundup-intl-hnk/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/2XNN-NTTF].  
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reasonable? Ten?49 The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, 
written at the behest of the Center for Disease Control in the wake of 9/11, 
recognized that governmental public health measures should utilize the 
least restrictive means available and permit judicial review.50 Although a 
close question, we believe that the government would be able to meet the 
clear and convincing standard as long as those quarantined have at least 
an informal right to contest the evidence that they have been exposed to 
the virus—was it a case of mistaken identity, did the person who allegedly 
expose them end up not contracting the virus, and so on. 
C. Antibody Testing: Constitutional Limitations for a Staggered 
Return to Normalcy. 
Italy,51 Great Britain,52 and New York53 have considered allowing 
those who have developed antibodies to return to work and travel. They 
can look to the Chinese government’s example, for it instituted software 
in common chatting and payment apps that require citizens to fill out a 
health survey, and then issued individuals a colored health code that 
dictates their ability to travel past checkpoints in subway stations, 
restaurants, hotels, and apartment blocks.54 Researchers remain uncertain 
if antibodies will indicate a lasting immunity to COVID-19, and whether 
that immunity might also apply to future mutations or strains of the virus, 
for which those with antibodies may still act as carriers.55 And not 
everyone without the antibodies is susceptible of catching the virus.56 The 
49. Cf. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (explaining how government must show 
under clear and convincing evidence that reasonable conditions would not have ensured the continued 
presence of an individual subject to a deportation order). 
50. See Lawrence O. Gostin, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Public Health
and Civil Liberties in a Time of Terrorism, 13 Health Matrix 1, 19 (2003) (providing that officials 
“m\ust use the least restrictive means available” in pursuing isolation and quarantines). 
51. See Horowitz, supra note 2. 
52. Mark Landler & Stephen Castle, After Lost Months, Britain Vows to Catch Up on Virus
Testing, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/02/world/europe/uk-
coronavirus-testing.html [https://perma.cc/TJ6Y-2P69]. 
53. See Horowitz, supra note 2. 
54. Sophia Ankel, As China Lifts Its Coronavirus Lockdowns, Authorities Are Using a Color-
Coded Health System to Dictate Where Citizens Can Go. Here’s How It Works, BUSINESS INSIDER 
(Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-china-health-software-color-coded-
how-it-works-2020-4 [https://perma.cc/9PAM-EDXM]. 
55. Horowitz, supra note 2. 
56. See Stacey McKenna, What Immunity to COVID-19 Really Means, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN
(Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-immunity-to-covid-19-really-
means/ [https://perma.cc/7ZSE-UPAS]. 
70 CONLAWNOW [12:57 
test for antibodies itself, so far, is inexact.57 Predicating such critical 
liberty interests as the right to work and travel on such probabilities 
challenges our notion of fundamental rights. We would be embracing two 
classes of citizenship, which may be both under- and over-inclusive. 
Without sufficient scientific support for the number and type of antibodies 
that effectively shield an individual from infection, using antibody tests 
as a guide to reentry will likely allow some unsafe individuals to return to 
normal life while denying basic rights to work and travel to others who 
are perfectly healthy. Under the demanding clear and convincing standard 
of review, courts could decide the constitutionality of these antibody-
based reentry programs either way, likely depending upon the strength of 
the presentation by health experts. 
The general quarantine carries with it the process protection that 
everyone is affected—there is no danger that the government is picking 
and choosing whom to elevate into the first rung.58 A police checkpoint 
that focuses on everyone passing by poses less danger to civil liberties 
than a roving power to stop anyone at will.59 In contrast, the antibody 
scenario would change that, and at high stakes. 
Governments would also need to ensure that licenses to travel are 
distributed without bias that might trace traditional racial, ethnic, or socio-
economic divides. This may be especially difficult if the tests for 
antibodies are particularly expensive and the costs are borne even partially 
by individuals. Poorer citizens may have been more likely to face 
infection in the first place,60 making them strong candidates to have 
developed antibodies as a result of those infections. But if they cannot 
afford the tests, their antibodies will go undetected and they will remain 
quarantined indefinitely. Thus, the government must provide such 
57. See Sheila Kaplan, FDA Orders Companies to Submit Antibody Test Data, N.Y. Times,
May 4, 2020; Camilla Hodgson & George Parker, UK Government Admits Covid-19 Antibody Tests 
Don’t Work (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/f28e26a0-bf64-4fac-acfb-b3a618ca659d 
[https://perma.cc/U6PN-YPEE]. 
58. There has been a trickle of litigation about whether a particular business constitutes an
“essential” service, but that has been the exception. The vast majority of citizens have been impacted 
by the shelter orders. See, e.g., Christian McPhate, Why McKinney’s Mayor Ordered Nonessential 
Businesses to Close–And Why He Was Sued For It, LOCAL PROFILE (Collin County, Texas) (Mar. 31, 
2020), https://localprofile.com/2020/03/31/why-mckinneys-mayor-ordered-nonessential-businesses-
to-close-and-why-he-was-sued-for-it/ [https://perma.cc/7YW4-6QDK]; Erica Orden, NRA Suing New 
York for Deeming Gun Stores Non-Essential Businesses During Coronavirus Pandemic, CNN, (Apr. 
4, 2020, 1:39 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/03/politics/nra-new-york-gun-store-non-
essential/index.html [https://perma.cc/H7LR-AZW4]. 
59. See Gentithes, supra note 43. 
60. See, e.g., Sam Baker, Alison Snyder, Coronavirus hits poor, minority communities harder, 
AXIOS, (April 4, 2020) https://www.axios.com/coronavirus-cases-deaths-race-income-disparities-
unequal-f6fb6977-56a1-4be9-8fdd-844604c677ec.html [https://perma.cc/6CSD-E78F]. 
2020] PANDEMIC SURVEILLANCE 71 
antibody tests at no charge, in addition to ensuring that those in rural as 
well as urban areas have comparable access. 
Moreover, in light of the liberty interests at stake, the government 
must permit individuals in the second class an opportunity to contest their 
placement. Those individuals might assert a right to be retested or argue 
that the test, although effective for most, is not indicative given their 
specific biological makeup. In light of the need for speed and the huge 
number of individuals in the second grouping, the hearings would be 
streamlined. Although the state need not provide a hearing before the 
classification, a reasonably prompt hearing after the classification should 
be required. Any such balancing calls to mind the Due Process framework 
of Mathews v. Eldridge61—the individual’s interests in travel and work 
are of course substantial, but so is the government’s goal of preventing 
too many people from travelling and congregating together. In short, if 
the government pursues the antibody approach, it must afford individuals 
a limited right to contest public health authorities’ determination that they 
lack the antibodies necessary for resumption of normal social activities. 
The nature of the government test for antibodies also raises 
constitutional hurdles. Assume that governments can only determine 
whether an individual possesses the antibodies in question through a blood 
draw. If the government hinges the rights to work and travel upon the 
results of such blood draws, it will effectively coerce all citizens to submit 
to those blood draws. Citizens’ desires to be released from quarantine may 
be so strong as to compel them to accept a government blood draw as a 
condition for that release.62 
Such coerced blood draws, taken without suspicion that an individual 
has committed any crime or run afoul of any quarantine orders, could 
violate the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court has previously held 
that blood draws, even conducted after a lawful arrest, are considered 
Fourth Amendment searches for which a warrant is normally required.63 
The mere fact that the contents of one’s blood may change quickly 
through normal metabolic processes is not a sufficiently exigent 
circumstance to fit an exception to the warrant requirement.64 Although 
61. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
62. In a related context, some authors have argued that prisoners’ desire for release from
incarceration is so strong that they cannot meaningfully agree to conditions attached to their probation 
or even pardon. See Harold J. Krent, Conditioning the President’s Conditional Pardon Power, 89 
CAL. L. REV. 1665, 1684–85 (2001).  
63. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148 (2013). 
61 Id. at 152 (“In those drunk-driving investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a 
warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the 
search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so.”). 
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the Court has recently permitted warrantless blood draws from 
unconscious vehicle operators suspected of driving under the influence,65 
that ruling considered blood draws from an individual driver found 
unconscious at the scene of an accident, where there was strong reason to 
believe the driver committed a crime, the driver’s blood would likely be 
tested at a hospital shortly in any event, and the officer’s duties in 
responding to the accident itself make obtaining a warrant 
impracticable.66 None of those criteria fits mandatory blood draws on a 
massive scale without any individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. 
Perhaps the government’s strongest argument again relies upon the 
special needs doctrine, including the impracticability of obtaining 
individual warrants for antibody tests and the government interest in 
restarting economic activity rather than controlling crime. 
Given the sympathy for the government’s power during a pandemic, 
courts might well uphold any plan to allow those who test positive for 
antibodies to return to work first, as well as to attend school, travel and so 
forth. The government’s highly critical need to limit the pandemic’s 
spread arguably justifies the sharp distinction drawn between those who 
are less and more likely to contract the disease. But the government must 
accompany any such determination with scientific evidence of the test’s 
efficacy, and the government must afford those relegated to their homes a 
measure of Due Process. Just as algorithms used in sentencing must 
ensure that the individual characteristics considered are pertinent and fair, 
government use of antibody tests to condition the rights to travel and work 
must be proven to have a scientifically valid connection to the likelihood 
of infecting others. 
The antibody approach comes with risks. Once more people are 
working outside of home and travelling, enforcement of the quarantine 
becomes more difficult. Moreover, those without the antibodies and 
desperate to work may be tempted to become infected so as thereafter to 
reenter the workforce.67 This potential moral hazard risks undermining the 
effectiveness of the quarantines themselves. Nonetheless, the two-class 
citizenship plan presents an option to the government in the recovery 
period if it tailors the program narrowly; permits individuals adversely 
affected to question their placement in the stay-at-home category; ensures 
that information gathered is not used for later crime control purposes; and 
65. Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2531 (2019). 
66. Id. 
67. Restarting America Means People Will Die. So When Do We Do It?, N.Y. TIMES 
MAGAZINE (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/magazine/coronavirus-economy-
debate.html [https://perma.cc/V29T-BU3Y]. 
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deploys such policies based upon sound scientific data about antibody 
development and immunity. 
III. BAKING IN PROTECTIONS
The government should protect privacy in any pandemic surveillance 
plan as much as possible. First, any pandemic surveillance program that 
analyzes personal data must come with clear sunset provisions ensuring 
that the program does not continue in perpetuity once the pandemic has 
passed. As the European Data Protection Board noted in its recent 
statement on processing personal data during the pandemic, emergency 
conditions might legitimize processing of personal data only if limited to 
the emergency period and not turned into a permanent program.68 Only 
clear sunset provisions can ensure that governments resist the temptation 
to turn pandemic surveillance techniques into a new normal for society.69 
Second, quarantine surveillance programs should ensure that data 
accessed during the outbreak is in safe hands and is destroyed once the 
crisis passes. Even if data has been anonymized and aggregated during the 
pandemic, there is no guarantee against future technological advantages 
that might allow the re-identification of individuals within the set. 
Furthermore, government investigators might develop new algorithms 
with aims entirely unrelated to the pandemic in future years, repurposing 
the data set in ways that could again focus on individuals rather than 
groups or otherwise curtail individual rights. If governments maintain the 
data well into the future, they create the potential for gross invasions of 
personal privacy.70 And if the data at issue includes information such as 
cell-site location data or highly sensitive medical records, such invasions 
might also run afoul of the Fourth Amendment. A proposal from the 
Center for American Progress suggests housing such data in a non-
governmental, non-profit entity, which would routinely destroy any data 
collected every 45 days.71 Such plans would helpfully reduce the long-
term privacy risks inherent in these surveillance programs. 
68. European Data Protection Board, supra note 42. 
69. After 9/11, Congress included a sunset provision in the Patriot Act, although it was
renewed after a prolonged debate, and subsequently amended. Martin Matishak, Surveillance 
Authorities Set to Lapse, Politico (Mar. 12, 2020, 7:58 PM), https://www.politico.com/
news/2020/03/12/rand-paul-to-oppose-surveillance-bill-127128 [https://perma.cc/T2L5-TRBM]. 
70. See Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions under the Fourth
Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49, 81 (1995) (making comparable argument about the risk of retaining 
information in DNA databanks). 
71. Zeke Emanuel et al., A National and State Plan to End the Coronavirus Crisis, CENTER 
FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Apr. 3, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/
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Third, pandemic surveillance must avoid creating a kind of “new 
normal” for citizens that lowers Fourth Amendment protections into the 
future. The restrictions that the Fourth Amendment places upon 
government investigators are based in large part upon society’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy.72 But the government itself shapes those 
expectations in part through new, highly-public programs that invade 
spheres of life previously considered private.73 Society’s view of what 
types and volumes of personal data should be kept away from peering 
governmental eyes can change as a result of such public programs that 
seem acceptable in times of short-term distress like the current pandemic. 
As citizens become inured to new and broader invasions of privacy, 
“reasonable expectations” of privacy under the Fourth Amendment 
decline. Publicizing the temporary nature of pandemic surveillance 
programs, along with providing clear explanations of their scientific 
validity and the process by which the data will later be destroyed, will 
keep pandemic surveillance under extreme circumstances from becoming 
standard government procedure for years into the future. 
CONCLUSION 
The pandemic swirling around us is unprecedented. Accordingly, 
unprecedented measures are needed to combat its spread. Although the 
Fourth Amendment may bend in such times, concerns for privacy should 
not be thrust aside in a rush to return to normalcy. Government decisions 
to isolate, quarantine, and (possibly) allow only one stratum of society to 
return to work must proceed only after reasonable scientific certainty is 
reached, and then only if those adversely affected can contest their 
placement in the disfavored group. Differentiating groups of citizens 
based on predictive analytics has proven dangerous in the past and may 
well prove so again in the coming months. 
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